

Chapter Two

Unions and the Strategic Context of Local Governance

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Throughout advanced industrial countries and beyond, local politics has historically provided a crucial focal point of organizing and influence for working class movements.¹ The comparative case studies of this volume highlight how, in the current era, this local focus has once again emerged as a major element in the opportunity structure of union politics. This chapter employs cross-national statistics to analyze national and local variations in the political opportunities for unions and other groups concerned with social justice within communities. Whatever the national context, the analysis shows urban coalition-building with other political and social groups to play an important role in effective union politics. Cross-national local comparison also reveals how the opportunities and risks of urban coalition-building in the United States differ from those in much of the rest of the developed world.

In the early phases of industrial unionism in nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, local political regimes and coalitions governing industrial cities were as crucial to working class politics as unions and parties at the national level (Katzenelson and Zolberg 1986; Dogliani 1992). Under conditions of relatively stable capitalist organization, and in alliance with middle class reformist movements as well as working class parties, unions furnished critical support for “municipal socialist” regimes at the local level (e.g., Steinmetz 2001). These local formations provided housing, educational, recreational and health services that often grew into components of national welfare states, and helped mobilize workers in national politics. In the multi-ethnic, more fragmented context of working class organization in the United States, the big-city political machines of Northeastern cities brought unions parallel channels of incorporation (Cornfield 1993; Katzenelson and Zolberg).

In the contemporary era, high-tech manufacturing, service capitalism, economic globalization and media-driven politics have limited the opportunities for unions to pursue local coalition-building around municipal socialist agendas. Accounts of contemporary capitalism that focus solely on the organization of firms and international markets (cf. Hall and Soskice 2001), however, neglect the important political opportunities that persist for unions to make gains through urban coalition-building. Rights to good jobs, decent wages, local services, and environmental quality remain a common cause between unions and an array of social justice movements within communities. The place-dependent business interests inherent in such services as tourism and retail distribution have opened up new opportunities for community-level politics (Sellers 2002, Ch. 5). The rise of environmental and neighborhood movements concerned with the quality of life may furnish a new common ground with working class politics. And in many cities disenfranchised immigrant workers offer potentially potent new constituencies for movement unionism around social justice.

This chapter offers a systematic contemporary snapshot of how the context of local politics varied in the 1980s and 1990s across the developed world, and the consequences for union influence at the local level. Statistical comparison will bring out both the effects from legacies of national institution-building in politics, the economy and civil society, and the common dilemmas that unions face.

Local Influence in National and Transnational Political Economies: An Analytic Framework

The strategic context of unions in local politics needs to be understood in light of both the other types of groups and political organizations that are also active in local politics, and the relation between different arenas of contestation in advanced industrial society. Much of the politics of local coalition-building around social justice plays out in arenas distinct from the arena of the firm itself, or even relations among firms. The institutionally distinct arena of local government, policy and politics also furnished part of the local opportunities for labor, as does the sphere of civic and social organization known as civil society (cf. Linz and Stepan 1994, Ch. 1). Synergistic relations between these different arenas played a crucial role in the municipal socialist politics of earlier eras. Parallel synergies continue to be critical to contemporary union empowerment through local politics.

Figure 1 portrays the overlapping nature of relations between these arenas. Local government, for instance, can regulate such aspects of firm activity as local plant construction and location or local wages. Local political parties can draw upon union support, provide benefits for union members and furnish part of the agenda for union organizing. By the same token, unions that seek to mobilize support within civil society for efforts to improve working conditions or wages may find it useful to advocate broader community agendas that affect the interests of union members even outside the workplace. Alliances with social justice groups in spheres beyond the firm make sense as a means to garner support as well as to further the interests of common constituencies.

On the one hand, unions can gain allies in the community. On the other, they can further the pursuit of social justice for union members far beyond the confines of firms.

[insert Figure 1 about here]

Reaching out to the community to build coalitions also holds potential costs for unions. As Offe and Wiesenthal argued decades ago (1985), political and civic interest formation outside the economic arena often coalesces around agendas that diverge from the interests of workers. A pluralistic political or civic arena leaves unions in the position of being only one among many potential interest groups. Resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978) predicts that more mobilized unions will succeed more in setting political agendas. But powerful allies that share agendas for social justice may also be crucial to making cross-sectoral coalitions work in the interest of both unions and the working class. As Peter Evans (2002) notes, opportunities in this process may be as much a matter of initiatives, responses, and solicitations from officials and established institutions as they are a product of what unions themselves do. Unions themselves can also represent narrower group interests or less disadvantaged groups.

In the following analysis, mass survey data from the World Value Surveys and elite data from the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project will be used to analyze what makes a difference for union influence in the local political process. As resource mobilization theory suggests, influence partly a matter of mobilization. Where unions and other social justice groups have organized more of the population, they can be expected to have greater influence. Coalitions with each other and with other social, civic and political associations can also enhance this influence. As cross-national comparison of local variations shows, different histories of working class organization,

civic association and local institutions have given rise to systematically different patterns of union influence.

Mobilization and Influence in Local Governance

A localized view of policy and the opportunities to influence it necessitates multilevel analysis of institutions and politics (Sellers 2002; 2005). The analysis that follows supplements the numerous datasets already available for variables at the national level with the most extensive dataset now available at the local level, the cross-national Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) surveys of small samples of mayors between 1985 and 1999 (e.g., Clark 2000). The analysis joins this dataset with the systematic evidence on associational membership and participation from the World Values Survey, the largest cross-national survey of individual political behavior and beliefs (cf. Inglehart, Basaeez and Moreno 1998). The combination of local elite and individual-level surveys enabled simultaneous comparative national assessment of both the influence of unions and related organizations within local government, and the degree to which unions and other organizations mobilized citizens.

Participation and mobilization in local organizations. The World Values Survey offers a clear cross-national overview of overall levels of mobilization.² In addition to a question about participation in unions, the World Values Survey question battery about mass participation in voluntary organizations includes two categories that also measure participation in other organizations that often represent disadvantaged groups. One of these, focused on voluntary organizations engaged in “community action,” covers those addressed to “issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality” (Inglehart,

Basaaez and Moreno 1998, p. 24). The other, encompassing “social welfare” organizations,” includes those providing “social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people (*Ibid.*, p. 19). At the same time, the battery asks about participation in an array of other types of civic associations less targeted toward social justice, from religious to cultural and environmentalist associations. The Survey thus offers an overview of how self-reported participation by individual citizens in associations devoted to social justice compares to wider patterns of civic participation (Table 1).

[insert Table 1 about here]

The patterns of participation in unions and social justice organizations on the one hand, and other civic associations on the other, fall into four broad types. In both the U.S. and Canada, union participation averages low, but participation in social justice organizations besides unions remains comparatively high. Most strikingly, strong participation in more general civic associations dominates average rates of participation in all social justice organizations. Since de Tocqueville, observers of the United States have pointed to the high levels of civic association (Ladd 1999; Putnam 2000). The relatively low levels of participation in social justice organizations in the U.S. have also long been noted (Verba, Nie and Kim 1975). U.S. citizens participate in general civic associations on average more than 9 percent more frequently than in social justice organizations.

The two Scandinavian countries, by contrast, reflect a long history of working class as well as general civic mobilization, and the strong welfare states that have emerged alongside unions and social democratic parties (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1985;

Stephens and Stephens 2001). The highest participation here occurs for unions and more generally for social justice organizations. Participation in social welfare organization remains among the highest of any advanced industrial democracies. More general participation in voluntary associations, although higher than anywhere except in North America, falls below the rates in social justice organizations.

In a third, more diverse group of countries, mobilization in unions, other social justice organizations and general civic associations remains comparatively lower than in either of the first two groups. Participation ranges from generally high in the United Kingdom to generally low in Japan. In a final category, Hungary as a post-communist setting retained high participation in unions despite low participation in all other kinds of organizations and associations (cf. Howard 2003).

Activity and Influence in Local Politics. Alongside overall citizen participation rates, our attention focuses on organizational mobilization and influence at the local level. It is at this level that the rank and file of many kinds of mass membership organizations is most active, and smaller civic associations are mainly centered. The FAUI survey, carried out among local elites from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, provides the most useful comparative indicator of the role of unions and other social justice groups at this level.

The survey reported here asked mayors or their representatives in national samples of municipalities ranging from 8,000 and above in population to rate the activity and influence of a range of different groups in the municipal budgetary process. Usually based on a five-point scale, this data permitted statistical comparison of the influence of

each of these groups both in relation to each other and among different cities domestically and abroad.³

Two separate questions for each type of local association or other actor were used to elicit this response. First, respondents rated how active the group or actor was in the local budget-making process. Second, they assessed either the extent of the local response to the efforts of this actor in the process, or (in a few cases) the general influence of the actor in the process. This data provided a clear snapshot of how much the infrastructure of local state-society relations, including the local organizational landscape as well as the official decision-making process itself, incorporated a given group. Any group that scored high in activity had mobilized to the point at which it came to the attention of local officials. Any one rated high in influence or response had clearly managed to parlay activity into effective power within local decision making processes. These findings can be considered alongside the individual-level data of the World Values Survey from the same period (1990-1993).⁴

FAUI survey responses on union activity and influence provide a gauge, filtered through the perspective of the local mayor, of how active unions are in the local budget process and how much influence they exercise. Each average rating in Table 2, taken from a five-point, or in Finland a four-point scale, is represented here on a standardized, 100-point scale on which 100 is the highest and 0 the lowest reading. Two categories taken directly from the different versions of the national surveys offered somewhat distinct versions of the same question. One of these, posed in Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and Korea, asked about unions in general. The other, used in the Australia, Britain, Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan and the United States, inquired about

unions along with public employees or professional local staff in general. Although this formulation excluded a large portion of unions, and asked about public employee influence beyond that of union organizations alone, it provided a useful comparative referent to the questions about unions in general.

[insert Table 2 about here]

Broad national differences in union influence stand out despite the limited parallels in the questions. Part of the variations corresponds to what resource mobilization theory might predict as a consequence of national differences in union density. In the two Scandinavian countries, the ratings of activity for unions in general average among the highest. What stands out the most in these settings is the unusually high level of responsiveness to unions in local government, some ten points on average above the level in any country except Japan, and higher on the scale than the rating of activity itself. Not only are unions more mobilized, but local corporatist practices have institutionalized regular opportunities for them to exert influence (Pierre 1999). Although professional unions in Finland are significantly less active, respondents rate them slightly higher in influence. Clearly unions are a major player in local budget politics here.

The indicators of union influence in the Anglo-Saxon countries need to be understood in light of the identification of unions with the public sector there. Here, where mass participation in unions is lower but civic participation higher, we find generally less union influence. In Australia and Britain, despite somewhat high levels of union density, unions are the least active and the least influential. In the United States and Canada, the activity of municipal unions and employees ranges considerably higher.

Yet in both of these countries, responsiveness to unions falls well below the average rating of local union activity. Municipal unions in Finland, although less active than their U.S. and Canadian counterparts, exercise much greater influence in local budget politics.

Among the remainder of countries, where union as well as civic density remained generally low, the ratings of local activity and influence vary widely. Mayors in Japan and Korea rated union activity as high or higher than their Scandinavian counterparts, and even French and Italian mayors assigned unions significant levels of influence despite low mass mobilization there.

Within local politics, the activity and influence of other groups oriented toward social justice varies in largely parallel ways. As Table 3 shows, most of the national surveys asked about the activity and influence of low income housing groups, renters or tenant groups and minority groups in the local budgetary process.

[insert Table 3 about here]

In Finland, the one Scandinavian country with results, mayors rated responses to the one other social justice group in the survey the highest on average of any group. At the same time, even more than unions, the activity of the group was assessed as relatively moderate by comparison with ratings elsewhere. In the United States and Canada, local groups of this kind were assigned somewhat higher average ratings for activity, but this greater activity went along with lower attributions of influence. Among other countries, the wide variations again had little to do with national rates of population participation in these organizations. Japanese mayors cited the highest levels of participation and influence in the survey, even as the levels of popular participation remained the lowest of

any country. If France could claim among the higher levels of participation and influence, Italy manifested among the lowest.

Clearly different national patterns of local influence go along with the cross-national contrasts in mass mobilization. In the United States and Canada, where mobilization in other forms of civic associations exceeds levels in unions or social justice organizations, and both social justice organizations and the unions for which data is available are quite active at the local level. Yet the local influence for these groups remains moderate (Figure 2). Finnish and Norwegian unions are by a wide margin the most mobilized, and exercise some of the strongest influence in local politics. Other social justice groups in these countries, although less mobilized, face similarly favorable conditions for local influence. Moreover, higher ratings for influence than for activity also suggest highly institutionalized opportunities to exercise that influence. In other countries, where mass participation in unions as well as other social justice and civic groups stand at lower levels, local influence and activity vary widely.

[insert Figure 2 about here]

Probing the Ecology of Local Influence

These differences in mobilization and in the local structure of political opportunity undoubtedly affect the strategies and coalition-building approaches of unions and their allies in the community (Sellers 2005). How much influence unions can wield depends on what types of coalitions they build both with other social justice groups and with other types of civic, business, and governmental actors. The FAUI survey enables a

cross-national, local test of the types of local contexts that have fostered greater union influence in the budget process. At the same time that these results reveal common cross-national tendencies, they confirm significant variations between national local contexts. Both the local and the national variations have significant strategic consequences for union strategies.

Figure 3 reports the significant results from multivariate models that used the activity of unions, and the combination of activity and influence for other actors, to account for the influence of unions in local budget politics. The three countries selected for this analysis represent the main national types of local contexts identified earlier: the United States⁵ (Figure 3(a)), Finland (3(b)), and France (3(c)). To further measure the influence from unions and other social justice groups, the diagrams include significant independent coefficients from regressions that modeled the determinants of influence for each of the other local groups and institutions listed. Arrows denote the directions of influence in these models. Although the union variables take a somewhat different form in each country, and in the case of public employee unions cannot be taken as a measure of unions alone, the results reveal a great deal about the strategic commonalities and differences in these settings.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

For the United States (Figure 3(a)), the results need to be considered in light of the relatively low mobilization of both unions and other social justice organizations, and the limited local influence they exercise. The public sector unions that are the only type of union represented here derive no apparent advantage from alliances with social justice groups or even public regarding civic groups. Instead, their influence waxes in contexts

where local administrators and more clientelist (in this instance, elderly) groups also exercise greater influence. They also contribute to the strength of business and clientelist interests, a relation that suggests reliance on narrow interest-group strategies. Social justice groups (see Table 3) rely on a very different network of civic and political support for influence. Both the religious and the more general civic groups that are most mobilized in U.S. cities contribute to the strength of social justice groups. Democratic party control of the local government contributes as well. If the U.S. FAUI survey had included a category for the unions that have sought to represent disenfranchised immigrant and service workers, it seems likely that these unions would benefit from similar movement-based coalitions. Consistent with the greater strength of civic associations in the U.S., the relation of these to social justice groups is asymmetrical. The civic groups that support social justice groups do not depend on them for influence. Still, public sector unions as well as the other social justice groups that are more active secure more local influence.

In the Finnish sample, the many significant regression coefficients highlight how the powerful unions there face a political opportunity structure that offers multiple avenues for greater influence. A further indication of how institutionalized this context is may be found in the lack of a relation between the activity and influence for either type of union or for other social justice groups by themselves. In contrast with both the U.S. and France, the high influence of these groups in local politics is assured regardless of how much they strive by themselves to enhance it. Even a left party orientation in the local government also makes no significant difference for local variations in the influence of these groups.

Finnish general unions rely on a host of other actors and even institutions in the community to enhance their influence. The synergistic relation with the strength of other social justice groups is especially clear. Each contributes to the strength of the other. Unions also do better when more general civic groups are more active and influential. Most distinctively, union influence in this corporatist context depends to some degree on the mobilization of local corporatist alliances. The influence of business and commercial organizations bears a significant ($p=.10$) positive relation to responsiveness to unions in local governance. Alongside these dependencies, unions also exercise stronger influence on the effectiveness of other groups and institutions than in either other national setting. In a further indication of institutionalized power, union strength in local governance brings a stronger role for officials of the national government. Even the clientelist groups (in this case the elderly) do better where general unions are stronger.

As the U.S. analysis also suggested, the local government professionals and related unions of the Finnish settings depend on very different configurations of local influence. Indeed, the influence of these unions bears a negative relation to that of social justice groups, and even works as a negative influence on the power of civic groups. Though associated with the strength of other categories of local administrators, the strength of these unions bears no significant relation to that of unions in general. Strong middle class groups with more specific material interests in local governance and its consequences, including homeowners and elderly groups, enhance the power of these unions.

In France, despite the low mobilization and moderate influence of unions and civic associations, local initiatives of unions and social justice groups themselves make a

difference that they do not in Finland (Figure 3(c)). Even more strongly than their own activism, unions depend on the local strength and mobilization of other social justice groups (here, renters associations) for influence in local governance. In contrast with the Finnish category of unions in general, this relation is not reciprocal. Renters associations in turn derive greater influence from stronger neighborhood associations. The influence of unions in local politics manifests fewer relations than in Finland to the influence other groups and institutions. Perhaps indicative of local clientelist relations, union strength contributes to stronger roles for local administrators as well as property-owner groups.

Several local sources of union influence are common to all three national contexts. Regardless of how high the national rates of union density or how institutionalized the opportunities for local union influence, unions benefited in the local process from the strength of other civic, political and institutional actors in the community. Unions in general benefited when other social justice groups were also stronger. Public employee and professional unions, which are often more middle class in orientation than unions in general, present a narrower, more privileged set of connections to the community and the state than do unions in general. But even these unions depended on commonalities with local civic, governmental and business interests. Consistent with the thesis of a difference between older industrial regions and newer, service-based economies, union influence in all three countries ranged higher in cities with higher proportions of the workforce in manufacturing. At the same time, the U.S. as well as the Finnish patterns manifest the importance of national infrastructures of institutions and organizations for local patterns of influence. The asymmetrical political opportunities for general unions in the U.S. context of strong, influential civic

associations stand in clear contrast to the institutionalized, more symmetrical opportunities of the Finnish context.

Conclusion: Taking Local Governance and Politics Seriously

The survey data examined here stop short of detailing the precise comparative dynamics of local coalition-building in different contexts. But examination of union influence in the politics of local governance clearly opens up an illuminating new perspective on the strategic possibilities for unions and their allies. Firm-centered accounts of the strategic possibilities for unions will only be complete when they take into account the possibilities for coalition-building in local politics and local civil society. Coalitions at the urban level around agendas of social justice, built on common interests with other social justice advocates and even more general civic and religious groups, offer a means to enhance union influence in local political processes. If pursued with the appropriate partners and agendas, coalitions in local politics can advance the interests of unions within local firms and those of workers more generally.

Comparative analysis also illuminates the differences that infrastructures of political, economic and civic institutions can make for local union strategies. Although largely national in scope, these infrastructures can also reflect variations between regions or cities within countries. The evidence here points to three distinct patterns:

--A *civic localist* infrastructure like that of the United States leaves governance at the local level more reliant on widespread mobilization among social justice groups, and within civil society more generally. In this instance the influence of social justice groups

depends both on their own activism and on the outcome of coalition-building and asymmetrical struggles for influence with other civic organizations.

--Under a *nationalized* infrastructure like that of the Finnish setting, unions and other organizations both mobilize the disadvantaged extensively, and have institutionalized chances for influence in local politics and policy. Nationally organized, politically engaged representative organizations assure high levels of participation by these groups. In this context, unions can count on alliances with organized business and even with state governmental representatives implementing national policies, as well as with social justice groups and local civic organizations. But the local initiatives of unions themselves have less effect on their own influence.

--In a *clientelist* type of infrastructure like that of France, mass mobilization is limited. Unions and social justice groups also have the opportunity to gain influence through local activism. Beyond bonds between each other, these community alliances around social justice can still achieve influence through relations with local officials.

Local coalition-building has special significance for the civic localist setting. Unions in the nationalized setting can fall back on institutionalized channels of influence within the government, on structured avenues for participation within the community, and a large mass base of membership. But in the civic localist setting of the United States, unions face stronger imperatives in favor of community alliances. At the same time that unions lack as wide a social basis of their own, more mobilized, more influential civic associations offer the prospect of powerful coalitions. Unions that can build these alliances can benefit. Those that cannot are likely to face more powerful local civic opponents than elsewhere.

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Figure 1







Figure 2**Mean Union Participation and Local Influence, by Country**

NOTE: + indicates FAUI averages for “municipal employees and their unions” ; other FAUI values for unions in general.

Figure 3
Influence By and Upon Unions and other Social Justice Groups
 (significant OLS regression coefficients)





* $p = .10$

** $p = .05$

*** $p = .01$

.01 NOTE: Public-regarding civic groups include the generic category “civic groups, sports clubs and youth associations” (Finland), ecologists (France), “civic groups” (US); clientelist civic groups include elderly groups (Finland, US), youth associations (France), retiree associations (France), and “users associations” (France); Taxpayers and Propertyowners include homeowners (Finland, US) and Propertyowners (France). Results based on imputations of missing values carried out using the program Amelia.

Table 1**Rates of Membership in Associations Serving Disadvantaged Groups and in Other Civic Associations, 1990-3 (in percent of respondents)**

Country	US	Canada	Britain	Australia	Finland	Norway	Switzerland	Japan	Korea	France	Italy	Hungary
Disadvantaged groups (mean)	7.7	8.3	8.3	(22.5)	16.7	18.7	6.0	3.0	8.7	5.0	4.0	11.7
Community action groups	5	5	4		3	3	3	0	13	3	2	1
Social welfare groups	9	8	7	(24)	11	11	9	2	6	7	4	2
Unions	9	12	14	(21)	36	42	6	7	7	5	6	32
Other local civic groups (mean)	16.9	14.3	9.1	(29.5)	11.7	13.1	9.4	4.1	12.3	5.6	4.1	3.8
Religious organizations	49	25	16	(39)	18	11	11	7	39	6	8	11
Educational or cultural associations	20	18	10	(28)	20	14	7	6	11	9	4	3
Womens groups	8	7	5		3	3	3	3	1	0	0	1
Environmental groups	9	8	6	(12)	5	4	11	1	2	2	3	1
Professional groups	15	16	11	(24)	15	16	14	4	13	5	4	6
Youth groups	13	10	4		5	6	4	1	7	3	3	2
Sports clubs	20	23	18	(52)	23	33	9	17	16	10	4	
Health groups	8	9	4		7	12	1	15	3	3	3	4
Other civic groups	10	13	8	(22)	9	19	5	4	5	2	2	
Disadvantaged versus others	-9.2	-6.0	-0.8	(-7)	5.0	5.6	-3.4	-1.1	-3.7	-0.6	-0.1	7.9

NOTE: Australia results reflect different question wordings of 1995-1998 World Values Survey, which substituted "Charities" for social welfare groups (approximately), "Arts" groups for educational and cultural, and did not include other categories. This survey also gave respondents a choice of either active or inactive membership.

SOURCE: World Values Survey, 1990-1993. (Australian results from 1995-1998 World Values Survey) Totals exclude those for several organizations with more limited national data or a predominantly nonlocal focus (peace movement, animal rights, third world development).

Table 2
**Unions: Mayoral Ratings of Activity and Influence in Local Politics (100-point scale),
With National Rates of Participation**

	United States	Canada	Australia ⁵	Britain	Finland	Norway ³	Switzerland	Japan	Korea	France ⁴	Italy ⁴
Union Activity General Mean (Standard Deviation)					55.11 (24.81)	48.8 (45.97)	33.62 (24.47)		66.77 (25.86)	45.20 (21.40)	39.25 (22.25)
Union Influence / Response ¹					58.69 (12.33)	75.5 (29.5)	47.78 (20.41)		50.64 (22.78)	44.50 (27.10)	46.75 (23.00)
Aggregated Union Activity and Response ²					57 . 51	63.95	40.7		58.71	44.85	43
Public or Municipal Employees and Their Unions	53.01 (26.01)	47.03 (25.86)	31.79 (27.10)		39.56 (23.05)			50.79 (23.48)		39.25 (31.25)	
Influence / Response	48.29 (27.48)	43.84 (28.8)	33.77 (27.74)	32.42 (28.76)	59.82 (13.56)			56.11 (24.38)		44.75 (30)	
Aggregated Public Employee Union Activity and Response	51.48	47.06	33.95		49 . 77			54.07		41.98	
Rate of national participation	9	12	(21)	14	36	42	6	7	7	5	6

1. Aggregated Union Activity: (Union Activity+Union Influence or Response)/2

2. Union Influence / Response: Union Influence + Union Response

3. The Norwegian questions for activity was whether the group contacted the mayor on the budget. The Norwegian measure of influence was whether the group had increased in influence in the past few years and the response categories were more active, about the same and less active.

4. For France and Italy, union influence/response data comes from "Influence."

5. Australian rate of participation reflects generally higher rates in the 1995-1998 World Values Survey.

SOURCES: Local activity and influence data from Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project surveys of local mayors between 1985 and 1995, standardized to 100-point scales; Rate of national active participation from International Survey of Human Values, 1990-1993; (for Australia) 1995-1998).

Table 3
**Other Social Justice Groups: Mayoral Ratings of Activity and Influence in Local Politics (100-point scale),
With National Rates of Membership and Voluntary Work**

	United States	Canada	Australia	Britain	Finland	Norway	Switzerland	Japan	Korea	France	Italy	Hungary ²
Other Disadvantaged Groups Local Activity (General) (S.D.)	42.14 (23.09)	39.06 (17.45)	28.70 (22.00)	28.47 (19.79)	37.85 (18.10)		38.45 (29.97)	61.65 (22.09)		42.00 (24.41)	17.00 (27.75)	
Other Disadvantaged Groups Local Influence / Response(S.D.)	39.40 (20.63)	34.26 (22.96)	31.25 (27.28)	42.94 (28.22)	56.18 (13.91)		40.06 (24.05)	51.42 (24.08)		45.25 (22.66)	22.75 (34.00)	10.12 (15.51)
Aggregated Other Disadvantaged Groups Local Influence ¹ (S.D.)	40.77	36.66	29.98	35.71	47.02		39.26	56.54		43.63	19.88	
Social welfare service organization membership (voluntary work) (%)	9 (6)	8 (6)		7 (5)	11 (8)	11 (4)	9	2 (2)	6 (7)	7 (5)	4 (3)	2 (2)
Community action organization membership (voluntary work) (%)	5 (3)	5 (4)		4 (1)	3 (3)	3 (1)	3	0 (1)	13 (3)	3 (3)	2 (1)	1 (2)
Average membership (voluntary work) (%)	7 (4.5)	6.5 (5)		5.5 (3)	7 (5.5)	7 (2.5)	6 (3)	1 (1.5)	9.5 (5)	5 (4)	3 (2)	1.5 (2)

1. Aggregated data: (Activity+Influence/ Response) / 2

2. Hungary does not have "Activity" data.

NOTE: Groups in this category include Low Income or Housing Groups (US, Canada, Australia, Britain, Finland, Japan), Renters or Tenant Groups (Switzerland, France, Italy), and Minority or Ethnic Rights Groups (US, Canada, Australia, Britain, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, Hungary).

SOURCE: Membership and voluntary work rates from World Values Survey 1990-1993. All other data from Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Mayoral Surveys, 1985-1999.

Endnotes

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² Subsequent administrations of the World Values Survey, particularly the one in 1995-1998, also enable a comparative overview of different levels of activity in an array of organizations. Although the results largely correspond to those reported here, this analysis focuses on the 1990-1993 data. These correspond most closely to the period of the FAUI survey for most countries, but also employ categories of disadvantaged groups that correspond more closely to those of the FAUI survey. Unfortunately, the differences in question formats between waves of the World Values Survey make it difficult to compare the results from these surveys over time.

³ Numbers of respondents varied between 415 in the United States to 89 in Finland. Variable response rates necessitate some caution in interpreting the FAUI data. Measured in relation to the number of questionnaires, these ranged from 40 percent in the U.S. to as low a 14 percent in Japan. However, no other current dataset provides a similar combination of local demographic and political data.

⁴ National sample sizes ranged from 1002 (France) to 1839 (U.S.).

⁵ OLS regressions of the FAUI data furnish the means to test effects from the efforts of unions and other social justice groups themselves alongside an entire range of additional influences that included the main actors in local civil society, governments at various levels, and local contextual conditions. Successive regressions took the average response to or influence of each social justice classification (all categories in the survey responses that referred to unions, then another category for the other social justice groups compiled in Table 3) as the dependent variable. As independent variables the regressions included the average of activity for that type of actor, the average of the influence and the activity for each other type, and the indicators of local social and cultural context. Additional FAUI responses permitted a rich array of additional groups to be considered in this fashion: higher level governments, local administrators, dominant local political parties (measured as left, right or neutral/nonpartisan), general civic groups, clientelist civic groups, taxpayer and property owner groups, religious groups, and neighborhood groups. Carried out separately but in parallel fashion for each national context, the models amounted to a comparative local ecological test of which actors were likely to depend on which others for influence. These could then be compared between the different national samples. Each regression also included several local contextual characteristics as controls: population size, manufacturing in the workforce, persons aged 18-35, and years of education.